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THE global financial crisis of 2007-2008 thrust mortgage lendingregulation to the forefront of discussions by policymakers and leg-islators. The crisis triggered a global recession, and in the United
States, millions of homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure. One
cause of the crisis was most certainly a failure of regulation.1
In reaction to the financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in
2010.2 After a period characterized by very little federal regulation of
mortgage lending, Dodd-Frank produced a sea change in the regulation
of mortgage lending by the federal government.
This symposium examines the new regulatory framework created by
Dodd-Frank from different points of view and considers other types of
mortgage lending regulation, including regulation at the state and local
levels and proposals for macroprudential regulation. Its participants
presented papers at the program of the Section on Real Estate Transac-
tions at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting in
January of 2016. As its name implies, Dodd-Frank is intended to provide
consumer protection and to lessen systemic risk. Professors Kathleen En-
gel and Christopher Odinet focus on the consumer protection aspects of
mortgage lending regulation, while Professor Steven Schwarcz focuses on
regulation to reduce systemic risk.
Long before the financial crisis and the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the
1980s began a period of deregulation of mortgage lending and preemp-
tion of state consumer financial protection measures that continued into
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1. See U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE U.S. xviii (2011); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A.
MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT
STEPS 149-187 (Oxford University Press 2011); Julie Forrester, The Subprime Lending Cri-
sis: How Did We Get Here?, THE QUAD, Vol. 39, p. 37, 40 (2008).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
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the beginning of the new century. In 1980, Congress enacted the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,3 which pre-
empted state usury ceilings on substantially all mortgage loans secured by
a first lien on residential real estate.4 Two years later, Congress enacted
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, which further deregu-
lated banks and savings and loan associations.5 One section of the Act
preempted state law regulation of due-on-sale clauses,6 and another sec-
tion, known as the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, pre-
empted state laws restricting alternative mortgage transactions, such as
adjustable rate mortgages.7
Federal agencies also joined in the deregulation game by preempting
state measures designed to protect homeowners in mortgage loan trans-
actions.8 In 1996, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued regula-
tions preempting state laws that affected federal savings associations and
their operating subsidiaries.9 These regulations preempted state laws gov-
erning licensing, credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origina-
tion, and interest rate ceilings.10 In 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) issued a regulation preempting the application of
state laws governing mortgage lending to national banks and their operat-
ing subsidiaries.11 The regulation was intended to have the same preemp-
tive effect as the earlier OTS regulation.12 It preempted state laws
governing licensing and registration, insurance requirements, loan-to-
value ratios, amortization, payments, loan term, escrow accounts, disclo-
sures, and due-on-sale clauses.13 The federal government preempted state
consumer financial protection statutes and, at the same time, failed to
provide a strong alternative.14
Many scholars criticized the deregulation of lending institutions and
3. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2006).
5. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1545 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(1) (2012).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (2006) (amended 2010).
8. See Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael Organ, Promising to be Prudent: A
Private Law Approach to Mortgage Lending Regulation in Common-Interest Communities,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 739, 749-50 (2012).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005). The regulations were issued pursuant to the Home
Owners’ Loan Act. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468.
10. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). The regulation “occupie[d] the entire field of lending regula-
tion for federal savings associations.” Id. § 560.2(a).
11. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2005)).
12. See 68 Fed. Reg. 46264 at n. 91 (Aug. 5, 2003); News Release, Comptroller of the
Currency, OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers
(Jan. 7, 2004), http://www.occ.treas.gov/static/news-issuances/news-releases/2004/nr-occ-
2004-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SEU-YWG6].
13. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2011).
14. Forrester & Organ, Promising to be Prudent, supra note 8, at 750.
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federal preemption of state consumer financial protection laws,15 and
many listed the lack of federal oversight as one cause of the crisis.16 As
the crisis unfolded, consumer advocates, lawmakers, and scholars made
calls for more stringent regulation of mortgage lending. In 2010, Congress
answered that call by enacting Dodd-Frank.
Dodd-Frank addresses numerous aspects of financial regulation, many
of which affect mortgage lending. For example, Title III of the Act makes
changes to the regulatory framework for banks and thrifts, eliminating
the OTS and placing supervision of thrifts under the auspices of the
OCC.17 Title VII regulates derivatives,18 and Title IX regulates credit rat-
ing agencies.19
Title IX also contains the “skin-in-the-game” rule, which requires a
securitizer to retain at minimum a 5% interest in the credit risk of any
asset that the securitizer transfers by issuing an asset-backed security.20
An exception to the 5% retention rule exists if the asset-backed security
is collateralized only by qualified residential mortgages.21
Title X of Dodd-Frank established the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (CFPB)22 to regulate consumer financial services, including
home mortgages, “for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have
access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that
markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transpar-
ent, and competitive.”23 The Act gives the CFPB broad regulatory pow-
ers to enforce federal consumer financial laws and to make rules to carry
out the objectives of those laws.24
Dodd-Frank specifically provides that the CFPB’s powers under fed-
eral law do not preempt state consumer financial protection laws that are
15. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005); Julia Patterson Forrester,
Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Sup-
ported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303 (2006); Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home
Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 388 (1994); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to
Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulations
and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000).
16. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 149; Forrester, The Subprime Lending
Crisis, supra note 1, at 40.
17. Dodd-Frank § 312(b)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B) (2010)).
18. Id. tit. VII.
19. Id. tit. IX, subtit. C.
20. Id. § 941(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i) (2010)); see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Macroprudential Regulation of Mortgage Lending, 69 SMU L. REV. ___ (2016).
21. Dodd-Frank § 941(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2010)). Note
that the qualified residential mortgage is not the same as the qualified mortgage safe har-
bor discussed in text accompanying infra notes 35-37.
22. Id. § 1011(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2010)).
23. Id. § 1021(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010)).
24. Id. § 1022 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515, 5564, 5581 (2010)). The Bureau has
promulgated many regulations. For example, a newly proposed CFPB rule would prohibit
providers of consumer financial products and services from including class action waivers
in arbitration provisions in their contracts with consumers. See Arbitration Agreements, 81
Fed. Reg. 32830-01 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
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more protective,25 and it limits the ability of the OCC to preempt state
consumer financial protection laws.26 Thus, states may once again adopt
and enforce their own consumer financial protection statutes.27 Further-
more, Dodd-Frank gives states the power to enforce CFPB regulations as
well as their own laws.28
Title XIV of Dodd-Frank, known as the Mortgage Reform and Anti-
Predatory Lending Act (Mortgage Reform Act), deals specifically with
home mortgage lending.29 Its “ability to repay” rule has provoked much
commentary.30 The rule requires home mortgage lenders to make “a rea-
sonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented
information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has
a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms.”31 In assess-
ing ability to repay, lenders must consider credit history, income, ex-
pected future income, debt-to-income ratio, employment, and assets,32
and must verify these factors by requiring reliable documentation from
third parties.33 Lenders must consider the borrower’s ability to repay a
fully amortized loan, even if the loan provides for payment of interest
only or for deferral of principal or interest.34
The Mortgage Reform Act creates a safe harbor for lenders regarding
the ability-to-repay rule by providing a presumption that a loan meets the
ability-to-repay requirements if it is a “qualified mortgage.”35 A qualified
mortgage is generally one that does not have certain features that make
loans more risky, such as negative amortization, high balloon payments,
25. Dodd-Frank § 1041(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)(2) (2010).
26. Id. § 1044(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5553 (2010)).
27. See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How
the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1302 (2011).
28. Dodd-Frank § 1042(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (2010)).
29. Id. tit. XIV (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. See, e.g., Amanda Brett Etheridge, Too “Qualified” or Not “Qualified” Enough?
Criticism and Suggested Reforms to the Currently Ineffective “Qualified Mortgage” Stan-
dards, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 17 (2015); Kevin P. Diduch, Close, But No Cigar: How
the Ability to Repay Rule Creates a “Disparate Impact” on the American Dream, 43 REAL
EST. L.J. 298 (2014); Patrick T. O’Keefe, Note, Qualified Mortgages & Government Re-
verse Redlining: How the CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage Regulations Will Handicap the Avail-
ability of Credit to Minority Borrowers, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413 (2016); David
Reiss, Message in a Mortgage” What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified Mortgage” Tells Us About
Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717 (2012).
31. Dodd-Frank § 1411 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2015)). In addition, the
borrower must have a reasonable ability to pay insurance premiums, taxes, and other as-
sessments. Id.
32. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3)). The CFPB issued regulations to flesh out
these requirements. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6461 (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1026.43(c)(2) (2016)).
33. Dodd-Frank § 1411 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4)); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)
(3), (4).
34. Dodd-Frank § 1411 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6)).
35. Id. § 1412 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)). Professor Odinet details the
requirements for a qualified mortgage. Christopher K. Odinet, The Unfinished Business of
Dodd-Frank: Reforming the Mortgage Contract, 69 SMU L. REV. 653. CFPB regulations
flesh out the requirements and provide for two different levels of lender protection for
qualified mortgages. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e).
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high points and fees, and that also meets certain underwriting
standards.36
In addition to the ability to repay rules and the qualified mortgage safe
harbor, the Mortgage Reform Act has a provision that is designed to pre-
vent lenders from steering borrowers to more expensive loans by prohib-
iting fees that vary based on any loan term other than principal amount.37
The Mortgage Reform Act also restricts prepayment penalties38 and in-
cludes other new prohibitions and disclosure requirements.39
Dodd-Frank has become a political lightening rod, with Democrats
praising it and Republicans threatening its repeal.40 It has also generated
significant scholarly commentary.41 A number of commentators have
hailed Dodd-Frank as a positive step in protecting consumers and the
market.42 Others have criticized Dodd-Frank on the basis that it swings
the pendulum too far in the direction of mortgage regulation,43 that it
does not go far enough,44 that it adopts the wrong approach to regula-
36. See id. For a discussion of the characteristics of risky loans, see Forrester, Promis-
ing to be Prudent, supra note 8, at 751-52, and for a discussion of the characteristics of
predatory loans see Forrester, Still Mortgaging, supra note 15, at 1312-13. A qualified mort-
gage may have a balloon payment under certain circumstances. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(f).
37. Id. § 1403 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1)).
38. Id. § 1414 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)).
39. See generally id.
40. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Carter Dougherty & Silla Brush, Banks May Have Over-
played Their Hand Fighting Wall Street Regulation, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2015), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/banks-swaps-win-gives-elizabeth-warren-
upper-hand-on-dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/7BCR-UVQ4]; Zach Carter, Second Verse,
Same as the First: Republicans Prepare Another Dodd-Frank attack, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/12/republicans-dodd-frank-at-
tack_n_6459722.html [https://perma.cc/S5NG-TUZ8].
41. A recent search on Westlaw generated more than 400 articles with “Dodd-Frank”
in the title, although some of the articles deal with aspects of Dodd-Frank not related to
mortgage lending regulation.
42. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 236, 252 (“Dodd-Frank takes bold
steps toward protecting consumers.”) (“Ultimately, Dodd-Frank is a mixed bag, containing
some failures and some successes.”); Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan
Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the
Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141 (2012); Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis
and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1325 (“Overall, Dodd-
Frank is a substantial step in the right direction, but additional steps still need to be
taken.”).
43. See Over-regulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb.18, 2012), http://
www.economist.com/node/21547789 [https://perma.cc/PTU4-YF2G]; Peter J. Ferrara, How
Over Regulation is Killing the Economy, IBD (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.investors.com/
politics/viewpoint/how-overregulation-is-killing-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/QTW4-
G2MJ].
44. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 42, at 1325 (“Overall, Dodd-Frank is a substantial
step in the right direction, but additional steps still need to be taken.”); Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to Fail
Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011).
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tion,45 or that it too severely limits the availability of credit.46
The participants in this symposium view Dodd-Frank and other mort-
gage lending regulation through various lenses. Professor Kathleen Engel
focuses on local government regulation of mortgage lending.47 She looks
at attempts made at the local, state, and federal levels of government to
prevent abusive lending practices through legislation as well as litiga-
tion.48 She explains that efforts by cities to regulate lending were struck
down because they fell outside the scope of authority of a local govern-
ment,49 whereas lawsuits faced the hurdle of establishing standing.50 She
argues that efforts by states and the federal government prior to Dodd-
Frank were simply insufficient.51 Cities have been somewhat more suc-
cessful after the fact in addressing problems of blight and abandoned
homes caused by the foreclosure crisis because courts and legislatures
have been more likely to find these problems within the powers of local
governments.52 Professor Engel argues that that local governments
should be given the power to regulate mortgage lending,53 and that cities
can fill the enforcement gap if given the standing to litigate.54 Finally,
Professor Engel makes specific proposals for expanding the powers of
local governments to regulate mortgage lending, to address blight, and to
sue.55
Next, Professor Christopher Odinet takes a new look at the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage instrument in the context
of the current regulatory environment.56 He begins by reviewing the his-
tory of standardization of the mortgage instrument and the benefits of the
uniform instrument to consumers and participants in the secondary mar-
ket.57 He then turns to a discussion of home mortgage finance before and
after Dodd-Frank. He examines the role of the CFPB in protecting home-
owners and the operation of the ability-to-repay rule and the qualified
45. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How
Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1539 (2015); Wilmarth, supra note 44, at Pt. V.
46. See, e.g., Diduch, supra note 30; O’Keefe, supra note 30. Professor Patricia McCoy
defends the ability-to-repay rule. Although mortgage credit is too tight today, Professor
McCoy points out that lenders had stopped making risky loans even before the ability-to-
repay rule took effect. Professor McCoy discusses the reasons for this overcorrection in the
credit market and ways to increase access to safe mortgage credit. 2015 AALS Annual
Meeting Podcasts, ASSOC. AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/aals-events/am-
media/2015-aals-annual-meeting-podcasts/.
47. Kathleen C. Engel, Local Governments and Risky Home Loans, 69 SMU L. REV.
609 (2016).
48. Id. at Pt. II.
49. Id. at subpt. II.B.1.
50. Id. at subpt. II.B.3.
51. Id. at subpts. II.C & D.
52. Id. at subpt. III.B.
53. Id.
54. Id. at subpt. IV.B.
55. Id. at Pt. V.
56. Odinet, supra note 35.
57. Odinet, supra note 35, at subpts. I.B & C.
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mortgage safe harbor,58 noting that more than 98% of new home mort-
gage loans were qualified mortgages in the fourth quarter of 2015.59 He
discusses recent abuses by servicers of the rights to inspect and secure
homes.60 Professor Odinet concludes that because of the more stringent
underwriting process mandated by Dodd-Frank, homeowners are less
likely to default on their mortgage obligations, making certain provisions
of the uniform mortgage unnecessary.61 He discusses and recommends
changes to three specific provisions be changed: the lender’s right to in-
spect, escrow requirements, and the lender’s right to secure the
property.62
Lastly, Professor Steven Schwarcz focuses on macroprudential mort-
gage lending regulation—regulation focused on reducing systemic risk—
rather than on microprudential regulation, which is intended to increase
economic efficiency by correcting market failures.63 He discusses two par-
ticular proposals for ex ante marcoprudential regulation—the “skin in the
game” requirement of Dodd-Frank, which requires securitizers to retain
some of the credit risk for securities that they sell,64 and a proposal that
lenders be required to overcollateralize mortgage loans.65 Because he
concludes that ex ante macroprudential regulation cannot completely al-
leviate systemic risk,66 he also discusses whether ex post macroprudential
regulation could be effective. He discusses the possibility of a privately-
funded governmental liquidity provider to create a financial safety net67
and the disruption of transmission chains relating to housing and housing
finance.68 He concludes by discussing where mortgage lending and its
regulation fit in the overall picture of systemic risk.69
Mortgage lending regulation promises to continue to be an important
topic of discussion because the bursting of a housing bubble can signifi-
cantly impact the health of the economy. In my thirty years of involve-
ment with real estate finance, I have watched real estate cycle through
boom and bust and mortgage credit cycle through periods of tighter and
looser underwriting standards. Only time will tell if current levels and
types of regulation will prevent abusive lending practices and lessen sys-
58. Odinet, supra note 35, at subpt. II.B.
59. Odinet, supra note 35, at 678 (citing National Association of Realtors, Seventh
Survey of Mortgage Originators 2015, 2 (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.realtor.org/reports/au
gust-2015-mortgage-originators-survey).
60. Odinet, supra note 35, at subpt. III.A.
61. Odinet, supra note 35, at 686.
62. Odinet, supra note 35, at subpt. III.C. On the other hand, Professors Engels and
McCoy “advocate mandatory escrow accounts for the life of all home loans” to protect
borrowers from unexpected tax bills and the risk of a tax foreclosure. ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 1, at 229.
63. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 597.
64. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 598; see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text
discussing the “skin-in-game” rule.
65. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 600 (citing Bubb & Prasad, supra note 45).
66. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 603.
67. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 603-04.
68. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 604-05.
69. Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 606.
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temic risk. The scholarly commentary provided by Professors Engel,
Odinet, and Schwarcz can help inform policymakers and legislators about
measures designed to protect against another crisis.
